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Abstract 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many jurisdictions and gastroenterological societies around 
the world have suspended nonurgent endoscopy. Subject to country-specific variability, it is 
projected that with current mitigation measures in place, the peak incidence of active COVID-19 
infections may be delayed by over 6 months. Although this aims to prevent the overburdening of 
healthcare systems, prolonged deferral of elective endoscopy will become unsustainable. Herein, we 
propose that by incorporating readily available point-of-care tests and conducting accurate clinical 
risk assessments, a safe and timely return to elective endoscopy is feasible. Our algorithm not only 
focuses on the safety of patients and healthcare workers, but also assists in rationalizing the use of 
invaluable resources such as personal protective equipment. 
Introduction: COVID-19 and Endoscopy 
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus termed SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a suspected zoonotic 
source in Wuhan, China. Driven by its ability to spread through respiratory droplets, including by 
asymptomatic individuals, SARS-CoV-2 has rapidly traversed international borders to infect over 1.5 
million people in over 200 countries.1 Now termed as coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19) by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), it is the first coronavirus to be declared a global pandemic and 
carries a mortality rate of 1% to 10%.1,2 In order to curtail the spread of COVID-19, restrictive 
measures have been implemented worldwide. This has included the closure of international borders, 
country-wide lockdowns, limitations on gatherings, social distancing and the quarantining of any 
suspected or confirmed COVID-19 cases.3 The overarching intention of these measures is to “flatten 
the curve,” ie, reduce the peak incidence of active COVID-19 infections and hospitalizations so that 
healthcare systems are not overburdened. Unfortunately, healthcare workers (HCWs) remain up to 3 
times more likely to contract COVID-19 than the general population,4 with up to 20% having 
contracted the disease within certain geographical regions.5  
Accordingly, jurisdictions and gastroenterological societies around the world have recommended the 
suspension of non-urgent endoscopy.6-9 In this article, we discuss the risk of COVID-19 transmission 
associated with endoscopy and the implications of a reduced endoscopy service. We propose that by 
incorporating readily available point-of-care (POC) tests and conducting accurate clinical risk 
assessments, a safe and timely return to elective endoscopy is feasible. Our algorithm not only 
focuses on the safety of patients and HCWs, but also assists in rationalizing the use of invaluable 
resources such as personal protective equipment (PPE). 
The Risk of COVID-19 Transmission during Endoscopy 
Endoscopy is currently limited to emergency or urgent procedures including the treatment of GI 
bleeding, foreign body removal, acute luminal obstruction, and cholangitis. Furthermore, the 
endoscopic diagnosis, staging, or resection of advanced lesions and malignancy may be performed 
on a case-by-case basis. However, as peak SARS-CoV-2 viral loads are reached in the presymptomatic 
phase of disease, there are concerns that upper GI procedures including gastroscopy, ERCP, and EUS 
may aerosolize virus particles that are shed from the nasopharynx of infected individuals.10 This risk 
may be further enhanced if a patient dry retches, sneezes, coughs, or requires endotracheal 
intubation. Although data on SARS-CoV-2 transmission via aerosol-generating procedures are 
lacking, prior studies on SARS-CoV revealed that HCWs exposed to such procedures were 4.66 times 
(95% CI, 3.13-6.94) more likely to become infected than nonexposed HCWs.11 With the detection of 
live SARS-CoV-2 virus in stool surpassing that of respiratory samples in up to 23% of patients,12-19 the 
risk of fecal-oral transmission during colonoscopy is also plausible. This concern is not unfounded, 
with tissue samples from the oesophagus, stomach, duodenum and rectum of COVID-19 patients all 
demonstrating the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA.16 Additionally, as microbial dissemination can occur 
up to 6 feet away from a patient undergoing endoscopy20 and bodily fluids may splatter when 
manipulating devices in and out of the working channel of an endoscope; there is also a risk of 
fomite and environmental transmission. This risk is extended to clerical and cleaning staff because 
SARS-CoV-2 has been demonstrated to easily contaminate a patient’s surroundings, including sinks, 
light switches, and doors,21 and is viable on plastics and stainless steel for hours.22  
Thus, because endoscopy is viewed as a high-risk procedure for COVID-19 transmission, current 
guidelines recommend the use of PPE for all emergency and urgent procedures, including a full-
sleeve gown, eye protection, hairnet, gloves, and respirator mask.23 Although there was an initial 
concern over a potential shortage of PPE in the United States, with over 500,000 cases by mid-April 
2020, this is looking less likely due to a smaller than projected case-load and increased PPE 
procurement,1, 24, 25 Another byproduct of current mitigation measures is the delay of the projected 
peak by a further 6 months.24,25 It should also be noted that the active case-load will take time to 
subside and the eventual relaxation of mitigation measures may also result in disease resurgence.26 
These additional challenges may result in a further delay to the re-institution of elective endoscopy. 
The Consequences of Reduced Endoscopy 
The importance of recommencing routine endoscopy is reflected by its economic and health 
impacts. In the United States, 17.7 million endoscopic procedures are performed annually, 
accounting for 5.6% of the population.27 Furthermore, over $136 billion USD is spent on 
gastrointestinal disease annually, exceeding that of heart disease, trauma and mental health.27 
Similar trends exist in less-populous countries such as  Australia, where over 850,000 endoscopic 
procedures are performed annually, accounting for 3.5% of the population, 13.0% of all same-day 
separations from healthcare facilities and 7.2% (or $5 billion AUD) of all public and private hospital 
expenditure.29,29 In the United States alone, a hypothetical suspension of elective endoscopy for 6 
months is predicted to result in the delayed diagnosis of over 2,800 colorectal cancers and 22,000 
high-grade adenomatous polyps with malignant potential.27 The 6 month mortality rate for those 
eventually diagnosed with colorectal cancer would increase by 6.5%.30 Just as ominously, with over 
600,000 cirrhotic patients in the United States, over 1,500 may have a terminal variceal bleed that 
may have been otherwise prevented by endoscopic surveillance .31-34 Thus, it is clear that the long-
term suspension of routine endoscopy is unsustainable, and therefore imperative that we resume 
elective endoscopy as early and safely as possible. A deeper understanding of available screening 
tools and the host-immune response to SARS-CoV-2 is valuable in working toward achieving this 
goal.  
 
SARS-CoV-2: Immunity, Testing, and its Implications on the Return to Elective Endoscopy 
 
Is Immunity to SARS-CoV-2 Possible? 
An animal study using a COVID-19-recovered rhesus macaque model raised the possibility of 
immunity to SARS-CoV-2 after the virus remained undetected in nasopharyngeal and anal swabs 
after an intra-tracheal re-challenge with SARS-CoV-2.35 Furthermore, a promising study on the 
plasma of recovered patients identified the presence of neutralizing antibodies, the activity of which 
was transferred to recipients after plasma infusion.36 Contrastingly, epidemiological data from China 
suggests that COVID-19 re-infection or re-activation may be possible, with a minority of recovered 
HCWs who experienced symptom resolution and had 2 consecutive negative PCR results, 
subsequently yielded positive PCR results up to 13 days later.37  Moreover, these recovered HCWs 
were only re-screened due to their need to recommence healthcare work. However, because the 
quality of the screening tests used is unclear, there is a possibility that the negative PCR results may 
have been false negatives. This is reflected in other studies that reveal that despite a median 
seroconversion time of 7 days and rising antibody titres, viral shedding and the clearance of SARS-
CoV-2 RNA from sputum and stool could take up to 3 weeks, including in asymptomatic 
individuals.15,38,39 Hence, given the limited body of knowledge pertaining to SARS-CoV-2 immunity, it 
would be prudent to currently assume that re-activation, re-infection, and viral shedding can occur 
despite seroconversion. 
Testing for COVID-19 
With the aforementioned concerns of aerosol-generation, spread by asymptomatic individuals and 
the possibility of re-infection, we believe that rapid point-of-care (POC) tests are a vital component 
of any algorithm proposing a return to routine endoscopy. Current testing methods for COVID-19 
include reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), isothermal nucleic acid 
amplification tests (iNAAT), clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR) assays, 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) and lateral flow immunoassays (LFA).  
Although lab-based RT-PCR performed on nasopharyngeal swabs is limited by a complex and 
expensive protocol that can take up to 4 hours to yield a result, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in the United States has recently approved a POC test that can yield a result within 45 
minutes.40 Now commercially available, it carries a 95% sensitivity for diagnosing acute infection, 
although it is unreliable beyond week one of disease as nasopharyngeal viral loads may reach 
undetectable levels.15,40 Although RT-PCRs can detect SARS-CoV 2 RNA in blood, this usually occurs in 
the setting of clinically severe disease14 and thus unlikely to be useful in assessing asymptomatic 
patients presenting for endoscopy. Both iNAAT and CRISPR can also be performed on 
nasopharyngeal swabs and are highly specific (>95%) to SARS-CoV-2 (41-44). Unlike RT-PCR, iNAAT 
does not require multiple heating cycles and therefore can provide results within 15 minutes with a 
sensitivity of >95%.45 A FDA-approved iNAAT POC test is readily available and has already been 
procured by clinics and hospitals across the United States. CRISPR relies on the Cas13a protein to 
form a complex with amplified RNA product, which then cleaves a fluorophore-quencher probe to 
produce a fluorescent light, signalling disease. Although it can yield a result in 60 minutes with a 
sensitivity of 90% and specificity of 100%, there is currently no POC test available.43,44,46-48 ELISA is 
inadequate for detecting early infection, with a sensitivity of 38.3% at day 7 of the disease.49 
Contrastingly, LFA combines IgG and IgM within a single assay to yield a result within 15 minutes 
with a sensitivity of 88.7% and specificity of 90.6%.50 A recent FDA-approved POC test only requires 2 
drops of blood via a finger-prick.51
A Proposal for the Return to Routine Endoscopy: Important Components 
Many units are to be commended for their work on COVID-19 risk stratification for patients 
presenting for endoscopy. Although Repici et al52 prudently stratified risk based on clinical and 
epidemiological factors, there is potential for asymptomatic individuals to be overlooked. More 
recently, Han et al53 introduced a laboratory-based RT-PCR test to assess risk, however this was 
time-consuming and it is unclear if it assisted in rationalizing the use of PPE. Interestingly, Lui et al54 
stratified risk based on the proposed endoscopic procedure, although recommend use of respirator 
masks in all cases. We believe that a safe return to routine endoscopy is possible by using a strict 
protocol that stratifies risk by combining an assessment of epidemiological and clinical risk-factors 
with the use of highly sensitive rapid POC tests (Figure 1).  
Epidemiological and Clinical Factors 
Clinicians should establish the pre-test probability of COVID-19 in asymptomatic patients based upon 
epidemiological and clinical risk factors. Although dependent on relevant locoregional factors, 
standard questioning can include: 
1) Epidemiological: Have you had close contact with a suspected or confirmed case of COVID-
19? Have you traveled overseas or on a cruise ship in the past 14 days? Have you been in
contact with anyone who has traveled overseas in the past 14 days?
2) Clinical: In the last 14 days have you had fever (>37.5°C), cough, sore throat, or respiratory
problems?
Point-of-Care Testing: Establishing a False Negative Threshold 
Population-screening data from Iceland suggests that up to 43% of COVID-19 patients are 
asymptomatic at the time of diagnosis.55 Hence, with over 500,000 cases in the United States and a 
current symptomatic prevalence of approximately 0.15%, the rate of asymptomatic disease can be 
estimated as 0.11% (or 370,000 persons). This information can be assessed against the sensitivity of 
available POC tests to determine the number of false negative results expected per 10,000 
asymptomatic individuals tested (Figure 2). For example, in an endoscopy unit that serves 10,000 
patients annually in the United States, a POC test with 95% sensitivity would result in only 1 false 
negative result. Comparatively, in a higher-prevalence population of 2%, there would be 10 false 
negative results per 10,000 patients. This, of course, would evolve with changes in disease 
prevalence and test sensitivity.  
Precautionary Measures Required 
If each endoscopy unit establishes a false negative threshold deemed acceptable to them, a 3-tiered 
system for the precautionary measures required during endoscopy can be used (Table 1). For 
example, in a low-risk patient with no risk factors and a negative POC result, should the false 
negative threshold be satisfied, then standard precautions may be used over enhanced precautions. 
The key difference here is the use of a surgical mask over a respirator mask, and may help preserve 
valuable PPE. As transmission of the small SARS-CoV-2 virus (3 µm) is via larger respiratory droplets, 
both masks may offer adequate protection. This is reflected in a previous study on SARS-CoV, which 
revealed marginally better protection by respirator masks (odds ratio, 0.86).56 However, studies on 
SARS-CoV-2 are lacking.  
 
A Proposal for the Return to Routine Endoscopy: Workflow Considerations 
 
Emergency and Urgent Endoscopy 
By the very nature of emergency endoscopy, for life-threatening procedures, POC testing should not 
be performed. The decision regarding the level of precautionary measures required should be 
determined through a clinical and epidemiological risk assessment. However, for urgent procedures, 
which we defined as requiring endoscopy within 3 days, POC testing (RT-PCR or iNAAT) offers the 
ability to further stratify risk (Table 1). For example, a patient with a low pre-test probability and 
positive POC result will require maximum precautions, whereas a patient with a high pre-test 
probability and negative POC result can proceed with enhanced precautions. To minimize 
unnecessary contact, all patients requiring maximum precautions should be kept isolated outside of 
the endoscopy unit and taken straight into their allocated procedure room, once endoscopy staff is 
ready. After the procedure, they should be moved into a dedicated COVID-19 recovery bay.  
 
Elective Endoscopy: Booking Cases 
For the safe and gradual re-introduction of elective endoscopy, cases should adhere to guidelines for 
the appropriate use of endoscopy and be triaged on their clinical merits.57 Patients with a low pre-
test probability should proceed to a serological IgG test to assess for previous COVID-19 exposure, 
whereas higher-risk patients should be isolated for further clinical assessment and only undergo 
serological testing once cleared. As viral shedding and viral RNA detection can occur up to 3 weeks 
postseroconversion, a positive serological result requires deferral of endoscopy for this time 
period.15 In the future, with greater clarity of a patient’s immune status, this delay may no longer be 
required. Although we acknowledge that false positive results may delay endoscopy by up to 3 
weeks, the alternative would be no endoscopy.  
Elective Endoscopy: Admission and Discharge 
On the day of endoscopy, patients should present to an independent screening bay located outside 
of the endoscopy unit. Upon arrival, a dedicated staff member using enhanced precautions should 
re-assess patient risk factors and perform a POC test (RT-PCR or iNAAT) to rule out acute infection. 
Patients satisfying all criteria would be allowed to enter the unit, with accompanying individuals 
remaining outside. Those with newly identified risk factors or a positive result would be isolated and 
re-triaged. If still deemed necessary to proceed, maximum precautions would be required. If 
deemed nonurgent, the procedure would be deferred until the patient is well and exposure to the 
risk factor has passed. Upon discharge, patients would be met by their accompanying individual at a 
separate exit to the unit. Follow-up should be organised with the referring physician by telehealth 
consultation if possible.  
Elective Endoscopy: Intra-Procedural Safety 
To reduce the spread of COVID-19, staff should use correct hand hygiene58 and follow local 
recommendations for the donning and doffing of PPE. In critical shortages, the re-use of respirator 
masks is possible after decontamination with ultraviolet light, hydrogen peroxide vapour or moist 
heat.59-65 Although the effect of these methods on SARS-CoV-2 is yet to be established, prior studies 
demonstrate effective inactivation of coronaviruses.59-65 To further conserve supplies, it is possible to 
conduct the donning of a respirator mask up to 5 times before fit factors consistently drop to unsafe 
levels.4,66 In such cases, great care would need to be exercised to avoid accidental contact with the 
front of the mask. Anecdotally, the use of a surgical mask over a respirator mask may help preserve 
it for longer, although further studies are required.67 However, these measures are unlikely to be 
required as the FDA has taken steps to increase procurement of PPE by providing clear guidelines for 
importers and manufacturers to follow .68 
Elective Endoscopy: Staffing Considerations 
Social distancing should be practiced by staff, with work conducted using designated chairs, 
computers and phones. As a contingency measure, endoscopy staff should be split into 2 teams, who 
work nonconcurrent shifts. Each endoscopy department should have a detailed plan addressing the 
systematic cleaning of all surfaces in the procedure room, including the chemical agents required to 
inactivate coronaviruse.69,70 If it is deemed that seroconversion confers immunity to SARS-CoV-2, 
then HCWs within the endoscopy unit should also be tested for COVID-19 at set intervals with 
serology-based tests. This may enable seroconverted staff to perform endoscopy in high-risk 
patients or those with confirmed COVID-19. However, at present, the duration and protective 
antibody thresholds after SARS-CoV-2 exposure remain unclear. Furthermore, if it is deemed that 
fecal-oral transmission is not viable, then colonoscopies in patients with a negative POC result may 
be able to be performed with standard precautions, irrespective of the false negative threshold.  
 
Conclusions 
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to conserve resources and reduce the risk of transmission, 
jurisdictions across the world have suspended elective endoscopy. With mitigation measures 
projected to increase the duration of the pandemic, elective endoscopy may be delayed for an 
unsustainable period of time. Our algorithm proposes a return to elective endoscopy in a safe and 
timely manner through a multifaceted approach to risk-stratification. This requires an assessment of 
epidemiological and clinical risk factors, rapid POC testing, and evaluation of a predefined false 
negative threshold based upon the prevalence of asymptomatic disease in the community and the 
sensitivity of the POC test used. This maximizes safety for patients and HCWs, whereas rationalizing 
the use of valuable resources such as PPE. Ultimately, herd immunity or vaccination may be required 
to reduce risk of community transmission and enable endoscopy units to reach full capacity once 
again.  
 
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1: Algorithm for a return to endoscopy during the COVID-19 pandemic. FN, False Negative; 
iNAAT, isothermal nucleic acid amplification; PPE, personal protective equipment; POC, point-of-
care; PCR, polymerase-chain reaction. 
 
Figure 2: The rate of false negatives per 10,000 asymptomatic individuals as determined by test 
sensitivity and the prevalence of asymptomatic COVID-19. 
  
Table 1: Three-tiered system for the precautionary measures required during endoscopy 
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